Infrastructure Leverage and Democratic Policy Autonomy: Measuring External Vulnerability in a Multipolar Order

Type
Open Panel
Language
English
Description

Formal sovereignty does not necessarily give governments complete freedom of action. As infrastructure financing becomes more closely tied to geopolitical competition, states may retain legal authority over their policies while facing growing economic costs for resisting the preferences of major external partners. This paper asks when dependence on foreign infrastructure investment begins to limit the practical policy autonomy of democratic governments.

The study builds on the Infrastructure Leverage Index and Projected Resilience Index to compare six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. The framework considers the concentration and strategic importance of infrastructure projects alongside financial exposure, trade dependence, governance capacity, and broader sovereign resilience. Comparisons with selected non-Latin American cases also help distinguish immediate project exposure from vulnerabilities that may become more significant over time.

The paper does not assume that foreign investment automatically produces coercion, political alignment, or democratic decline. Instead, it identifies the conditions under which external economic relationships may make it harder for governments to renegotiate projects, regulate strategic sectors, absorb financial pressure, or adopt policies that conflict with the interests of an important foreign partner.

The central argument is that infrastructure leverage becomes politically significant when concentrated exposure is combined with weak oversight, limited fiscal flexibility, and insufficient transparency. Under these conditions, democratic institutions may continue to function formally even as the range of realistic policy choices becomes narrower.

By connecting infrastructure dependence with policy autonomy, the paper contributes to broader debates about democratic resilience, strategic competition, and governance in a multipolar international system. It also offers a transparent comparative framework for identifying where economic vulnerability may develop into political constraint.

Onsite Presentation Language
Same as proposal language
Panel ID
PL-4049
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